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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane; Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie.*—Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL AND METAPHYSICAL.

Evolution and Immortality. A. H. LLOYD. Monist, X, 3, pp. 387–421.

Evolution, if consistent, must view life not as a local and temporal endowment, but as an affair of a universe spatially and temporally indivisible. So viewed, life includes and unifies all parts of man's nature, and frees immortality from dependence on wholly separate unworldly souls. Individuality, too, is transfigured, depending not on separate existences but on relationship. So evolution implies relationism and monism, while creationism, opposed to evolution, implies pluralism and dualism. For creationism immortality is absolutely another and after life; for evolution "now is the accepted time," *this* life is the immortal life. Christianity is open to monistic, evolutional interpretation.

But more clearly to understand evolution and immortality, to find the real meaning of the yonder and the hereafter and the other, one needs to examine space and time and matter. For modern thought, then, the spatial and temporal, instead of being opposed to the real, is intimate with the real. Space is not composite or divisible, for its parts are in and of each other; and similarly of time and the parts of time; not statically, of course, but dynamically the parts of space—or of time—are coextensive. The calculus, to which we owe the dynamic view, by its use of the infinitesimal testifies to this active coextension of parts. Accordingly, the local is not the isolated but the related, and is, therefore, in a genuine sense omnipresent, and in like manner the momentary is also eternal, and upon the omnipresence of the local and the eternity of the temporal rests the already asserted intimacy of the spatial and temporal with the real. Furthermore, space and time are intimate with each other, for the coexistences of space make the temporal eternal, while the sequences of time make the local omnipresent. Witness the current doctrines of recapitulation and environment, of memory and foresight, and of motion and force. For physical science today force is the necessity of motion, and motion is in and of space, not of something in space. But these two inseparable intimacies make reality organic and so at once material and spiritual. In the conception of organism, due not less to physics than to psychology, not less to mathematics than to biology, matter—the divisible—and spirit—the indivisible—are made one; as inseparably one as the divine and the human in its most directly human example, the brotherhood of man. In reality, moreover, as organic, we see that which changes but never dies, which changes but at the same time conserves every part of itself. The composite and divisible may decompose, and decomposition is death, but the organic is spatially and temporally indivisible. The organic, then, is a constant triumph over death, even over the death of individuals, and also over their birth. Individuality, *real* individuality, even as Christianity seems to declare, is not begotten nor does it die. The conditions of space and time only 'transmute' it.

To practical life the meaning of the foregoing is that all those manifold relations, which give life its worth and make us that live real, are, like the whole to which they one and all belong, organically indivisible. We often speak of the unity of nature or the unity of life, but we may speak also of the unity of motherhood or the unity of friendship; and in such unities lie our own immortality and that of our fellows. Is it a conscious immortality? It cannot but be conscious, for consciousness, affair as it must be of an indivisible universe, is coextensive with life. To argue that the absence of memory in infants or the lack of communication with the dead is evidence at least of consciousness being subject to birth and death, is simply to show a misunderstanding of memory and of communication in general. Memory is never literally of the past. The other world, the spiritual world, really does communicate with the life that is, but in and through it, not from without to it.

Finally, the evolutional view of immortality has important consequences for the interpretation of history, as well as for the more personal interests and relations of mankind. For evolution the immortality of one's kin and one's friends, as well as one's self, is in the very life and consciousness that continues among men; and, as regards the interpretation of history, this can mean simply that the life of the past and the life of the present must really be treated as one, not two. The persons of the past are not fixtures independent of the current of history, rather, they have lived and moved with it, and are still alive and conscious in the activity of today, as if our own past selves. We live with them and they in us. Moreover, apparently in this sense Christianity is now thinking of the living Christ, and, in general, evolution does interpret the different doctrines of Christianity, the conception, the resurrection, the divinity, the sacrifice, the immediacy of the kingdom of heaven, and the brotherhood of man.

AUTHOR.

Professor Münsterberg as Critic of Categories. R. B. HALDANE. Mind, No. 34, pp. 205–217.

From Kantianism flowed two streams of philosophy, that of Hegel, and that of Schopenhauer. To the former experience was a whole, and existed for the subject as the ultimate reality. To the latter experience existed for volition, and ultimate reality was to be found in practical rather than theoretical activity. The term existence, then, imparts to the former an object for intelligence, and to the latter an object or end for the will. Münsterberg in *Psychology and Life* adopts the point of view of will as ultimate reality, and so identifies himself with Schopenhauer. His position then is novel only in this, that he is the first to attempt a systematic criticism of categories from the point of view of will as the Hegelians had attempted from the point of view of reason. The sciences, he says, proceed by abstraction, each under its own category. Psychology deals abstractly with sensations regarded as atomistic elements. As such it can never attain to the reality of life, the real will itself. And similarly with other sciences which deal with phenomena which are external to consciousness. Psychology then will be of but little value to those who deal with real life, such as the teacher and the historian. To think that life can be interpreted in terms of our science would be psychologism, while to force upon science the views of real life would be mysticism. Each interpretation has its own proper place, though the will side of reality is ultimate. The psychologist then does not investigate the real will, but a highly artificial substitute of it. This leaves the real will, as with Schopenhauer, blind and unintelligible. But in reaching this conclusion reason has been employed, and logical thinking has been assumed as valid. Hence the difficulty of building on any other foundation than reason. This is the weakness of the Schopenhauerean position, and we can only hope for a completion of Hegel's view to guide us to the true nature of ultimate reality.

A. W. CRAWFORD.

Hegel's Treatment of the Categories of the Idea. J. ELLIS MACTAGGART. Mind, No, 34 pp. 145–183.

The Idea is divided into stages entitled Life, Cognition, and the Absolute Idea. Life applies not only to living beings, but to all reality. The unity required by the category of Life must be such as to provide for plurality. The unity must be complete in each individual, and yet must be the bond which unites them. It must be *in* the individuals and also *for* the individuals. This leads to Cognition, in which alone this becomes possible. But consciousness would be a better name than cognition. Only in consciousness can there be a unity which is at once the whole of which the individuals are parts, and which is also completely present in each individual. This category, however, seems rather a synthesis of the difficulties of the former category, Life, than an antithesis, as it should be by its place in the triad. But the subordination of the triadic form does not impair the validity of the transition. Cognition is, then, the true synthesis of the contradictions of life. But its unity is not itself conscious, for the individuals do not need to exist for the unity, because the unity is not different from all the individuals together, and there being nothing outside the unity, it would have nothing to cognize. Lotze, however, says it cognizes itself. Hegel errs in taking the category of Life to imply a plurality of living beings, for here we have only an aggregate, and not an organic unity. A real harmony and unity of the individuals appears when we reach Cognition. In Cognition proper the aim of the subject is to reproduce in itself the state of the world at large. Volition means a sense of approval of objective reality as in harmony with our desires. So in the *Larger Logic* this category is called the Idea of the Good. This asserts, then, that the unity reproduces the nature of the individual. But Volition cannot completely reconcile the individuals and the unity. Hence another category, the Transition to the Absolute Idea, which Hegel does not specially mention. To insert this is necessary for clearness, though being at the end of the dialectic, it is identical with the next category the Absolute Idea, and as such requires no separate treatment. The Absolute Idea alone has complete objective reality, and this reality is a differentiated unity. There are no contradictions here, and so no need of any further category. There is, however, an imperfection, and this drives Hegel on from pure thought to a Philosophy of Nature, and finally to a Philosophy of Spirit. In the Absolute Idea we find the individuals and the differentiations as constituting reality, or rather as constituting the immediate centers of differentiation, and the relations which unite and mediate them. Reality has been taken to be one or other of these. Green took it to be the latter. But to the dialectic reality consists of immediate centers which are mediated by relations. This must be one of the forms of consciousness, and is rather emotion than knowledge or volition. In emotion only do we find that absolute balance between the individuality and the unity, and the individual separateness which is necessary for reality. What Hegel's own view was seems rather doubtful. The Logic would seem to point to emotion, and the Philosophy of Spirit to knowledge. The two elements, however remain, the unity, or that which gives to experience a *must*, and the special natures of the individuals which it unites, and which give to experience its *is*.

A. W. CRAWFORD.

On the Nature of Scientific Law and Scientific Explanation. THOMAS McCORMACK. Monist, X, 4, pp. 448–572.

We are concerned here with a study of the concept of natural law, and with the nature of scientific explanation in general. Like all other things in nature, the concepts of natural causality and natural law are products of evolution. Pythagoras was the first to appreciate the place which the laws of form play in any philosophical explanation of the world. But the Greeks lacked one thing which was essential to the rapid development of physical principles, and that was what moderns call mathematical analysis. "With the development of arithmetic, algebra, and modern analysis a new sphere of experience was unrolled, and its conquest has marked the establishment of the concepts of law, of causality, and of determinism in science, until finally the whole development culminated with Leibnitz and John Bernoulli in the notion of a function." It remained for the successors of Descartes to extend to nature in its entirety his conception of the union between geometry and algebra.

The problem for science is equivalent to what in mathematics might be called "the search for the *form* of the function," by which through mere mechanical manipulation dependent variables may be determined from independent variables. There is or there is not a discoverable connection between certain given events of nature. It is the business of the scientific inquirer to discover the *form* of that connection. The law of falling bodies and the law of refraction, two simple instances of actual scientific laws, involve special features of the economy of thought, prophesy of the future, and reconstruction of the facts of the past. "The element of comparison is at the basis of all scientific explanation. Bare description does not necessarily constitute the essence of science, and scientific description understood in its highest and in its lowest sense, always proceeds by comparison." The conception of scientific explanation, which makes of it a *description* of nature, involves an elimination of the metaphysical elements from science, economy and simplicity of the notions of science, and the power of reconstructing nature. All scientific systems, all so-called natural laws, are intellectual devices for reproducing the course of nature in the imagination. According to the view of the writer of this article, scientific explanation is itself a natural phenomenon. "Thus dualism is eliminated, and the conformity of the mind to the world appears as the natural conformity of two coördinate parts of the same consistent and orderly whole. Science takes its rise as the forms of life have taken their rise, by the adaptation of the mind to its environment."

L. M. ALDRICH.

Sur la géomètrie numerique. A. CALINON. Rev. Ph., XXV, 6, pp. 614–620.

Heretofore the science of geometry, says M. Calinon, has been based entirely upon the principle of geometrical equality, that is, two figures have been called equal to one another if they coincide when one is superimposed upon the other. Two equal figures have been considered as two different positions of the same figure. This, however, gives no absolute standard of measurement. Therefore the new or numerical geometry rejects the principle of geometric equality, and replaces it by the principle of numerical or relative equality. It takes as its base a numerical definition of distance—which then becomes, for all practical purposes, an absolute standard—and from this it deduces all its propositions. For all measurements are purely relative. They depend upon the choice of some one single thing as standard to which all other things of the same kind are then compared. Logically, the choice is arbitrary, but certain particular selections are made for the sake of the simplicity, elegance, and usefulness of the solutions which result from them.

GEORGIA BENEDICT.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

The Nature of The Creative Imagination. TH. RIBOT. International Monthly, I, 6, pp. 648–675; II, 1, pp. 1–25.

By the creative imagination Professor Ribot means the power of producing mental images, for the most part motor, which realize themselves in the actual production of their appropriate bodily movements, both molar and molecular. Indeed, the motor image *is* but the actual bodily movement in an incipient stage, and may be either productive or inhibitory. This power of imagination is best illustrated by the phenomena of hypnotic suggestion, paralysis of ideas, healing by faith, etc. These phenomena, however, do not, as is commonly supposed, consist merely in the intellectual production of mental images, but have at least three factors, an intellectual, an emotional, and an unconscious. The importance of the second of these is seen in the fact that not all can be healed by faith, but only those who are actuated by an impassioned desire, aversion, emotion, or passion. It is in the emotional factor, as purely organic, that the *elixir vitæ* is really to be found: it is the emotion that makes the image motor. The creative element, however, is to be found in all three factors. Considered from the point of view of the intellectual factor, imagination involves two complementary processes, 'association' and 'dissociation,' and from the mutual and constant interaction of these two processes no act of imagination can be purely reproductive, purely redintegrative, but is always to some extent creative: new elements are added, old ones omitted, according as the unique moral, emotional, and bodily condition of the subject dictates for the moment. The essence of creative imagination, therefore, on its intellectual side, is the faculty of "thinking by analogy," that is to say, by partial resemblance, and, as much, it lies at the basis of all creative or inventive genius, whether in art, literature, or practical life. If now we turn to the emotional factor, we find that it too can function creatively in the production of entirely novel intellectual combinations. States of consciousness may unite, not because of contiguity or resemblance, but because they have a common affective tone. Joy, sadness, love, hate, etc., may, therefore, become centers of attraction around which images group themselves which have no logical connection, and thus an almost unlimited field for intellectual invention is opened up for us. Nor must it be supposed that this emotional factor is limited to the creative imagination of art and literature; it is also quite as prominent in mechanical invention, where it appears in diverse forms as joy, fear, hope, disappointment, satisfaction, etc.; no inventive act of thought is produced *in abstracto,* it is always tinged, and sometimes deeply tinged, with emotion. By the unconscious factor in creative imagination Professor Ribot means all that is meant by the popular term 'inspiration.' Inspiration has two outstanding characteristics, suddenness and impersonality. In order to explain these characteristics Professor Ribot accepts the theory of mediate association, first propounded by Hamilton, and which, among the experimental psychologists, has been accepted by Scripture and denied by Münsterberg. Not only may we have single unconscious mediating ideas, but we may have groups of them. The influence of these groups upon our conscious states make it impossible for us to previse at any one time what path our conscious association will next take. It is in this absence of prevision that the impersonal and sudden character of inspiration consists.

In these three factors, then, we have the analysis of the creative imagination. Their principle of unity is to be found in focalized attention, a state of relative monoideism, which on the intellectual side becomes the fixed idea, and on the affective side the fixed emotion, or passion.

IRA MACKAY.

On the Psychology and Physiology of Reading. I. E. B. HUEY. A. J. Ps., XI, 3, pp. 283–302.

This is a record of experiments upon eye movements in reading, reading pauses, word perception, and the extent of the reading field. In considering eye-movements, the researches of Javal, Lamare, Landolt, and Erdmann and Dodge are briefly reviewed. The author's own experiments aimed to supplement and check the findings of these earlier investigators by the aid of a more efficient technique. The results show that in nearly all cases the eye moves over the matter read line by line. The eye seldom moves along the whole extent of the line, and the first fixation is usually nearer the beginning of the line than the last is to the end. The forward movements of the eye occupy a tolerably constant time almost irrespective of the arc traversed. As a rule the return movements are without a break. There is nothing to indicate that the rate of movement is under the control of the will. Regarding movement pauses, passages read at a maximum speed show a decrease in the length of the reading pause, and, as speed of movement is not increased it would seem that increase in speed of reading is brought about chiefly by decreasing the number of reading pauses. In considering word perception and the extent of the visual field, brief reference is made to the earlier work of Cattell, Goldscheider and Mueller, Griffing and Franz, and Quantz. Huey's preliminary experiments show that the first half of the word is much more important for word perception than the last half. In his later work he attempted to determine the extent of the matter which can be read at one fixation. Cattell's fall-tachistoscope was used in these experiments, and the time of exposure was in the vicinity of 0.01 sec. The author proposes to outline a word and phrase perception theory as opposed to a letter perception theory in a subsequent paper.

W. C. BAGLEY.

Disturbances of Apperception in Insanity. J. W. SLAUGHTER. A. J. Ps., XI, 3, pp. 303–312.

All studies of insanity from the psychological standpoint must deal, the author maintains, with disturbances of apperception. The doctrine of apperception, especially as developed in recent years by Wundt and Stout, is briefly outlined. By apperception is to be understood "a dual activity in consciousness . . . namely, the functioning of all the subordinate systems in the formation of a judgment, and the activity of the judgment, or the organization of consciousness as a whole in the reception of new sensations." The various forms of delusional insanity are then considered as disturbances of this apperceptive functioning.

W. C. BAGLEY.

Experimentelle Beiträge zur Lehre vom ökonomischen Lernen. LOTTIE STEFFENS. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., XXII, 5, pp. 321–382.

Miss Steffens's study involves the results of some very careful experiments carried on in Professor G. E. Mueller's laboratory at Göttingen. From a series of preliminary tests, she determined that the customary procedure in learning a given text 'by heart' involved the division of each stanza into parts, and the mastery of one division at a time, repeating the first few lines, then taking up another section and repeating the two together, and so on until the entire selection could be repeated without error. None of the subjects tested was in the habit of repeating the stanza as a whole until it was mastered. Miss Steffens then prepared an elaborate series of experiments to determine the relative value of these two methods of procedure. She found that in every instance the customary 'piecemeal' method was less economical than the procedure involved in repeating the selection as a whole until it was mastered. The reason for this lies, the author maintains, in the fact that an association is formed between the final syllable of one section and the initial syllable of the succeeding section, and that the procedure by the customary method tends to establish this association less firmly than the second procedure.

W. C. BAGLEY.

Elements of Conscious Complexes. MARY WHITON CALKINS. Psy. Rev., VII, 4, pp. 377–389.

The object of this paper is the "demonstration that every conscious experience may be treated as a content-of-consciousness, and analyzed into its constituent elements." The sensational or 'substantive' element is the first to be considered, and under this head qualities and intensities, as well as the conscious criterion which distinguishes them, are discussed. The affections are treated as 'attributive' elements. Under 'transitional' elements are included the conscious contents correlated with the verbal expressions 'different,' 'whole,' 'many,' more,' etc. These three classes of elements—substantive, attributive, and transitional—combine to form complex conscious contents in which one or another of the elemental forms predominates. Thus the predominance of 'substantive' elements makes the complex either a percept or an image; when the 'attributive' elements predominate the complex becomes an emotion, a belief, or a volition; and when the 'transitional' elements predominate the complex is a 'feeling of wholeness' (the judgment), 'a feeling of familiarity' (the recognized or the remembered), or a 'feeling of generality' (the general notion).

W. C. BAGLEY.

The Personifying Passion in Youth with Remarks upon the Sex and Gender Problem. JAMES H. LEUBA. Monist, X, 4, pp. 536–548.

This systematic account of one instance of a remarkable tendency to personify and sexualize, not only numerals, and letters of the alphabet, but everything else as well, follows a brief statement of the sex and gender problem of philology. Seven is for the consciousness of Mrs. X, "a decorative old piece of bric-a-brac," the apple tree is a "devoted foster mother," and three and six, as also four and eight, "stand for assorted couples, the smaller number being the female and its double the male." Mere chance, the looks of the thing, its quality or virtue, its situation, and many other properties and contingencies, are said to account for these associations. The paper concludes with a few considerations touching the influence of the passion of Mrs. X on her religious life.

LENA M. ALDRICH.

Les esprits synthétiques. F. PAULHAN. Rev. Ph., XXV, 6, pp. 561–595.

This essay—a companion article to a paper on analytical minds in an earlier number of the review—proceeds to consider psychologically the characteristics which mark the predominantly synthetic mind in art, literature, industry, science and philosophy. Such minds are always distinguished, it is held, by a certain forcefulness, and generally by breadth and ardor, but their reluctance or inability to examine with care the ground of their conclusions limits, or even destroys, the value of the conclusions themselves. The tendency is to make the synthesis too hastily. Synthetic minds are of all ranks, rising from the semi-idiot to the genius, but this bent for subordinating fact to theory is visible throughout. The most notable minds among them are those in which the powers of synthesis and analysis are nearly balanced. Herbert Spencer, in particular, is cited as an example of such a balanced synthetic mind. Indeed the last section of the essay is devoted to a study of those minds which—whatever their natural gifts—are "in equilibrium."

GEORGIA BENEDICT.

Fanatisme et charlatanisme: étude psychologique. L. DUGAS. Rev. Ph., XXV, 6, pp. 596–613.

In this study of those abnormal states of mind which find expression in fanaticism or, what M. Dugas considers much the same thing, in charlatanism, they are held to spring in the first place from the predominance within the mind of some single thought in consequence of which it refuses to admit any opposing idea. The fanatic is the victim of a strong imagination. He is a visionary who strives to realize his dream against all opposition. If the opposition is so strong that our visionary gives up any hope of realizing his ideal, save in himself, perhaps, he degenerates into the charlatan. "The charlatan is the powerless fanatic," declares our author. This peculiar state of mind has many developments. As one man when he cannot act often takes refuge in high-sounding words, so another, whom circumstances keep from words even, delights in unfettered thoughts. In these men we often discover a curious scepticism, a disregard of results, an irresponsibility which amounts to mania, and which would seem, indeed, to be the normal result of this abnormal condition. Hence, concludes M. Dugas, "no wrong is done to thought by preventing its departure from the domain of action. It is only confined to its proper aim, held to its own nature, and to the office demanded by its own dignity."

GEORGIA BENEDICT.

Remarks on the Predicates of Moral Judgments. EDWARD WESTERMARCK. Mind, No. 34, pp. 184–204.

The various predicates of moral judgments are ultimately based on either the emotions of indignation or approval. These are very like resentment and gratitude, differing only in the fact that the moral emotions are disinterested and relatively impartial. In modern ethics the 'ought' is generally taken as ultimate and unanalyzable. But it appears to be decomposable into conation and imperative. What 'ought not to be' calls forth moral indignation. The ideas of 'ought' and 'duty' thus spring from one source, viz.: the emotion of moral indignation. Right, however, is not identical with what is obligatory, but includes also the super-obligatory. Thus it derives its import from the notion of oughtness, and carries with it a duty. But rights and duties are not identical, for it is not always a man's duty to exercise a right. With the notion of right is connected that of justice, and justice is the discharge of a duty corresponding to a right. The essence of justice lies in impartiality within a recognized order of rights. Justice, then, which is a kind of rightness, obviously has its origin in moral indignation. There are also predicates involving moral approval, chief among which is 'goodness.' This is not identical with right, but represents a different point of view. Virtue denotes a disposition of mind which is characterized by some special kind of goodness. Virtue is goodness tried and tested, and is to be distinguished from duty and from merit. Merit expresses a tendency to give rise to the emotion of moral approval. Merit also refers to something more than duty, or to that which is somewhat unusual. In the morally indifferent, and in the super-obligatory, we find the ultra obligatory. 'Indifference' is often taken to refer to the means used to reach an end which is not itself indifferent. This cannot be correct, for thereby it would form a link in the obligatory. The attempt to make every action a moral concern is but a hollow and flattering tribute to the idol of duty.

A. W. CRAWFORD.

The Source of Moral Obligation. J. S. MACKENZIE. Int. J. E., Vol. X, 4, pp. 464–478.

The author here treats his subject in a popular style, and from a practical point of view. Except in ages of faith there is in most men's lives a region of doubt and indecision. The good man of two generations ago was an individualist (one who thinks mainly of personal obligations). The point of view has now shifted, and social obligation and not personal virtues and duties occupy the thoughts of the good man of the present day. The imperial problem has compelled us to face the new question of our obligations to the progress of civilization throughout the world. International ethics is still in the individualistic stage; the 'honor' of a nation is but the honor of a gentleman in the old duelling days. Thus practical problems of the day force upon us the question of the source of moral obligation. I. The authority of the state has been regarded as this source, both by primitive peoples and to some extent even at the present time. This does not touch many aspects of the life of the modern man, nor is it adequate when we think of the obligations of the state towards subject races or towards other sovereign powers. II. Among early peoples the will of the divine power or powers was the source of moral obligation. To-day this is unsatisfactory, for modern thought tends to proceed from the idea of morality to the idea of God, rather than from the idea of God to the idea of morality. III. Conscience, which was long regarded as the voice of God, is connected closely with the preceding as a source. Conscience however needs education, and thus we are led to: IV. Reason. Farther than this we cannot go. As reasonable beings we cannot but be convinced that whatever actions are reasonable are right. This source of moral obligation is a somewhat dry one, and, in spite of Kant's efforts to prove the contrary, cannot of itself furnish us with any real content for the moral life. All that reason can do is to point us to some end at which it is reasonable to aim. The thought of that end becomes the ultimate source of moral obligation. We can only get to understand that end by studying human nature in the concrete in relation to the conditions under which it has to develop. The great lesson of modern thought is that our whole life is a development, that it is only through its growth that we can learn by degrees what its meaning is; and that its claim upon our devotion lies simply in its being the only way in which we can realize what we truly are. Only by living can we grow in understanding of the duties of life.

HARRY L. TAYLOR.

The New Psychology and the Moral Training of Children. HENRY DAVIES. Int. J. E., X, 4, pp. 493–503.

It is only since the rise of the evolutionary method of thought that we can be said to have come to know the child. Psychology has especially given its attention to this study, particularly in its relation to child-training. After the labors of Perez, Preyer, and Sully, the child-mind no longer is a *terra incognita.* With our knowledge of the forces of environment, and heredity, and self-activity, we are no longer content with the haphazard in child-training. The methods of home, kindergarten, and primary school have been revolutionized as the results of this study, which are briefly :—(*a*) Child study. To strengthen the self-activity of the child and make it superior to the forces of heredity and environment, each child must be studied as an individual. (*b*) Arouse the self-activity of the pupil. Self-activity is the principle which organizes mental evolution through imitation. (*c*) Teach by interest rather than by rule of authority. (*d*) Rely on the routine of school work for *moral* training. (*e*) Indirection or influence is the chief power in the religious training of the young. Every teacher should know what the new psychology says about attention, interest, fatigue, and habit. The new psychology has shown us that in the line of emphasis in child-training feeling comes first, volition next, and intellect last. Excessive zeal for the new compels the writer to sound a note of warning. The new psychology fails to recognize the complexity of the child-mind. This has led to confusion in pedagogy. Over-estimation and exaggeration are also possible, as Dr. Harris seems to show in his *Psychological Foundations of Education.* Secondly, justice is not done to the ethical nature of children. The moral and religious nature of children is wholly disregarded in all recent works. Our analysis of childhood does not go deep enough. To regard a child as merely intelligent, limits our insight and cripples the higher effect of our teaching. Finally, the new psychology is in danger of perverting the ethical aspect of child-training. At present the emphasis is almost wholly on mechanism, the theory being that moral habits are to be formed by conforming the mind of the child to a definitely chosen and wisely administered system of studies. Morals are not taught, and religion is as though it were unworthy of notice. Teaching is an ethical process to the core, and the greatest teachers have been those of the profoundest moral and religious feeling. If we wish a nation to be moral, as well as intelligent, we must see to it that school education provides for moral instruction. The new psychology and the new pedagogy cannot fail to recognize this fact, and *the* problem of the twentieth century will be the moral training of the young.

HARRY L. TAYLOR.